Follow the Money Part One
The world’s workforce demographics, housing markets, and social dynamics are about to be struck by a tidal wave of change. In this report, we delve into the underlying systems that stand broken, the shifts that are accelerating their reinvention, and the challenges and opportunities they present to the built environment industry — for seniors’ housing and care communities, and beyond.
This report is of interest to:
- Investors in private equity, real estate, and healthcare
- Developers of lifestyle/healthcare technology
- Designers and developers of seniors’ housing and care facilities
- Retirees and those nearing retirement
Key Terms: RISK, INVESTING, RETIREMENT, AGING, SENIOR HOUSING, COMMUNITY, PLANNING, DESIGN, HEALTHCARE, RECESSION, FINANCIAL SECURITY
Dave Gilmore, President & CEO | Rob Hart, Senior Researcher
Chyenne Pastrana, Director of Marketing | Nicole Puckett, Lead Graphic Designer | Beckie Hawk, Web Master
FOLLOW THE MONEY: PART ONE
Tracking the Pandemic’s Economic Shocks
In February of 2020, the world entered a time of chaos due to a cascade of system failures precipitated by the coronavirus pandemic. Calling this a crisis of public health understates the calamitous impacts across other domains: education, finance, trade, culture, and politics.
Perhaps no industry has seen as much disruption of its momentum as the Built Environment Industry, whose financial mainstays have begun to falter while “dark horse” contenders surge ahead. Amid such turbulence, some confusion is natural — but the fragmentation of modern media compounds the problem, making today’s financial landscape indecipherable.
For creative designers and courageous investors, the crux of the problem is a lack of access to trustworthy, comprehensive, and timely information with which to make sense of this new territory. To equip these leaders, DesignIntelligence has crafted a careful analysis — a view from 40,000 feet to instill a deeper sense of our time and place. Part 1 of this report surveys the rapid fluctuations and policy changes at a global and national scale, unpacking their implications for business development. In Part 2, we closely examine the shifts in each building market sector, exploring what design leaders can do to manage risks and secure new opportunities.
What we have unearthed is not only a story of disruption, but one of decision: this crisis presents a fork in the road, an opportunity for deep, directional change toward healthier economies, cities, and businesses. At this historic moment, true agents of change can shift the courses of billions of lives — if they embrace solid information and shrewd strategy. To you, the bold, we offer this insight, starting with the big picture.
Global Context: The Economic Crisis
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We are experiencing the deepest recession since the end of the Second World War.
The International Monetary Fund has predicted an overall decline by 4.4% of global GDP,1 while the World Bank projects an even more severe contraction of 5.2%, conservatively calling this figure its “baseline forecast.”2 Both institutions expect an even steeper decline in advanced economies (8% and 7%, respectively). In a report gathered by Pensions & Investments Online, independent financial experts made similar predictions.3
The International Monetary Fund has predicted an overall decline by 4.4% of global GDP.
In a report gathered by Pensions & Investments Online, independent financial experts made similar predictions.3
It’s All (Too) Connected
There are more nations in recession at once than ever before.
These figures already make the 2020 recession nearly three times as severe as the 2008-2009 global financial crisis,4 yet the impacts are even more widespread. Not only are the growth of goods and services, trade volume, commodity prices, and employment at historic global lows — there are more nations in recession at once than ever before.5
ECONOMIES IN RECESSION
The 2020 recession is nearly three times as severe as the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.
The tight financial linkage isn’t just between countries. A precarious relationship between disparate markets has also emerged: they’re too closely interwoven. Surveying securities and exchanges across the globe, analysts at J.P. Morgan found correlations across 30 asset categories had reached a 20-year high.6
In market logic, high correlations across various assets represent a danger to investors,7 whose efforts to hedge their exposure can be thwarted by cross-market downturns. Crashes in one category can more easily lead to cascades across others — and this risk is now higher than it’s been in two decades.
Cross-asset correlations are at 20Y highs, implying limited scope for diversification.
THE FLOATING COYOTE THAT WON’T LOOK DOWN
Despite initial shocks from news of lockdowns, worldwide financial markets have rebounded, and many continue to climb.
Like Wile E. Coyote walking off a cliff and into thin air, the finance industry has yet to register the true gravity of the situation — but leading investors and economists warn that markets will plummet.
Around the same time, billionaire investor Jeremy Grantham told CNBC, “My confidence is rising quite rapidly that this is, in fact, becoming the fourth ‘real McCoy’ bubble of my investment career.”10 Not one for idle talk, Grantham is “noteworthy for his accurate predictions about three major market bubbles: Japan’s asset-price bubble in 1989, the dot-com bubble in 2000, and the housing crisis in 2008,” according to Markets Insider.11 His warnings in 2020 should be taken with equal seriousness.
Famed investors George Soros and Warren Buffett have both recently shown they agree, with Soros vocally refusing to participate in a “bubble fueled by Fed liquidity,”12 and Buffett breaking his own long-standing rule: selling bank stocks and buying gold.13
In July, a Forbes analyst reported that the NASDAQ and Dow Jones Industrial Average had each formed an “inflating parabolic bubble,” a mathematical signal of over-valuation that precedes a rapid descent.14 In September, the Financial Times showed that the ratio of market capitalization to GDP had just exceeded 200% — a record high — in an article titled, “This US stock bubble could rank among the biggest in history.”15
In its June report the IMF warns, “The extent of the recent rebound in financial market sentiment appears disconnected from shifts in underlying economic prospects… raising the possibility that financial conditions may tighten more than assumed in the baseline.”16 In other words, the market fundamentals don’t support these stock valuations. The experts agree: the coyote must eventually look down.
A NOVEL CATACLYSM
Experts have never seen a pandemic recession before, so they don’t know what to make of it.
Throughout the many investment briefings, economic studies, and financial forecasts issued in the past several months, a consistent theme arises: the unprecedented nature of this catastrophe defies all available models, making experts highly unsure of their own predictions.
The World Bank’s Economic Outlook report concludes with the warning: “The experience of past global recessions suggests that it takes time for forecasters to process incoming data and fully recognize the magnitude of recessions… Moreover, the uniqueness of the COVID-19 global recession brings another challenge: professional forecasters and economists have a more limited understanding of the growth implications of a global recession driven by a pandemic, because of their very limited experience with them, than of previous global recessions, which were triggered by more run-of-the-mill financial and policy shocks.”17
Put more plainly: experts have never seen a pandemic recession before, so they don’t know what to make of it.
That report also cites an innovative metric: the World Uncertainty Index, a measure of the prevalence of the word “uncertain” in Economist Intelligence Unit country reports since 1990.18 This year, the index recorded its all-time high.
Implication: predictions are less reliable now than ever, including forecasts from IMF and World Bank economists. Both institutions openly admitted in their mid-year reports that their recovery models, which relied on the pandemic lasting only until late 2020, could entirely miss the mark. In light of such assumptions, their predictions of global recovery by mid-2021 are proving overly optimistic.
WORLD UNCERTAINITY INDEX
This innovative metric is a measure of the prevalence of the word “uncertain” in Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. Units are derived from the number of occurrences of the word "uncertain" in the Economist Intelligence Unit's country reports, which are then scaled by the total number of words and multiplied by 1,000. The fourth quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, the index recorded its all-time high.19
Implications for Business
We are witnessing the largest contraction of goods and services since the Great Depression, and it’s only just begun.
During the more recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-08, growth bottomed out at -1.674% in its worst year,20 and experts project 2020’s negative growth to be about three times worse, ranging from -4.4 to -5.2%.21 22 Worldwide unemployment during the GFC peaked around 200 million workers,23 yet surged beyond 400 million by the second quarter of 2020.24 While not all these losses are considered permanent, they reveal a level of privation not seen in nearly a century, with no clear end in sight.
2020 SHARE OF WORLD’S EMPLOYED WITH WORKPLACE CLOSURES
Recommended closures for the world’s employees stayed above 85% for most of 2020.25
Following the 2008 recession, it took a full ten years for global employment to return to baseline.26 It’s reasonable to expect the lasting economic damage from this recession to be more severe throughout the world, and for a full recovery to take proportionally longer. The World Bank notes,
Beyond its short-term impact, deep recessions triggered by the pandemic are likely to leave lasting scars through multiple channels, including lower investment; erosion of the human capital of the unemployed; and a retreat from global trade and supply linkages.27
Since this is the first global recession since 1870 to be triggered solely by a pandemic,28 any path to recovery will require international cooperation to produce an integrated medical, social, and economic solution. Normal market fundamentals cannot foretell the outcome nor the timeline of such a recovery.
However uncertain the landscape, it’s clear that impacts in developed economies are the most severe. By IMF and World Bank estimates, per-capita GDP declines in advanced nations will be some 2.5 to 3 times worse than those in emerging economies. Notably, China, Bangladesh, and Egypt are expected to produce small but positive growth,29 while the European Union and United Kingdom are projected to contract by 8 to 10%.30
Debate has intensified over globalization. Many see the pandemic recession as a final nail in the coffin31 for globalized travel and trade,32 while others see globalization as the reason for hope of recovery.33 Eschewing these deterministic extremes, multiple Nobel Prize winners and distinguished economists agree that it’s neither doom nor deliverance, instead seeing the crisis as a call to rethink, renegotiate, and redesign global trade.34 They argue that the next normal will be constructed rather than discovered, and that the lessons of present and past crises can serve to make international relationships more diverse, balanced, and resilient. But to grasp these lessons and apply them, they warn, we must avoid reactionary isolation and work to understand the present recession and its causes.
Following the Money in the U.S.
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Economic impact in the U.S. was severe, with unemployment rising higher in three months of COVID-19 than in two years of the Great Recession35 and hitting low-income families the hardest.
Exact figures were uncertain due to data collection efforts being thwarted by the pandemic, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded 14.7% official unemployment (U3), with the admission that actual unemployment could be much higher;36 in June, Pew Research equated current unemployment to the Great Depression, when the official rate reached 25%.37 2nd-quarter GDP shrank by more than 32% annualized,38 setting the record for the worst quarter in U.S. history.
Mirroring its approach to the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing bailouts, the United States’ newer, more aggressive monetary policy was deployed at full strength. If we follow the money, then by far, the largest movement of capital has been into existence — new dollars created by the Federal Reserve at a record-setting rate.
Employment loss during the current recession is concentrated in low-wage jobs40
Initial weekly unemployment claims, both regular and those under Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program, which extends eligibility to some workers that would not otherwise qualify for benefits, such as part-time or self-employed workers.39
GDP % CHANGE
The GDP dropped more than 32% annualized in the second quarter of 2020.41 Advance Q3 estimates, based on incomplete data, project a 33% increase over Q2 — but this does not signify a complete recovery. In fact, it puts Q3 GDP 10% lower than in Q1.
According to the Federal Reserve Board Website, from December 2019 to October 2020 the institution increased its total assets by 66%, from $4.2 trillion to $7.1 trillion and rising.42 It did so by digitally creating new dollars and spending them to purchase securities, expanding its balance sheet and the total number of dollars simultaneously. It has also accelerated the rate at which money enters the economy by lowering interest rates to near-zero for the next three years,43 speeding up lending. This massive cash influx raises three major warnings.
The first is that the balance sheet is easier to expand than it is to contract; whenever the Fed has tried to shrink its assets back to normal — effectively deleting money — financial markets have reacted negatively. According to Janet Yellen, chair of the Federal Reserve in 2016, “our ability to predict the effects of changes in the balance sheet on the economy is less than that associated with changes in the federal funds rate. Excessive inflationary pressures could arise if assets were sold too slowly. Conversely, financial markets and the economy could potentially be destabilized if assets were sold too aggressively.”44 Since then, some of the Central Bank’s leading economists have begun to argue that the balance sheet must remain large indefinitely, and that its controls over market rates must expand.45 To recap, when the balance sheet grows large, it tends to stay large. Since the Fed must maintain the federal funds rate any way it can, if it keeps a large balance sheet, it also has to control more of the free market.
The second implication is that a large influx of new cash is theoretically supposed to devalue the dollar and raise prices, but this impact takes time; the money has to circulate through the market before prices rise — and lockdown keeps much of the price volatility under the radar.46 When inflation happens, it undercuts lower classes first, since basic living costs rise while wages stagnate. Eventually, it strikes upper classes, financial markets, and new business growth. Getting word out ahead of this impact, current chair Jerome Powell announced a relaxation of the Fed’s inflation policy in August. In the past, their target has been a constant inflation rate of 2%; going forward, the bank says it will instead target average inflation at 2% — but will not commit to any formal definition of “average.” In Powell’s words, “In seeking to achieve inflation that averages 2% over time, we are not tying ourselves to a particular mathematical formula that defines the average. Thus, our approach could be viewed as a flexible form of average inflation targeting.”47 So without a doubt, inflation will miss the 2-percent target. Some economists say the nominal 2-percent target, coupled with the new unemployment policy, belies an actual 3- or 4-percent inflation norm.48
A third, more weighty implication lies in the difference between past recession bailouts and the Fed’s response to the current crisis. This is now the largest balance the Central Bank has ever carried, the fastest it has ever expanded the dollar supply, and the widest array of assets it has ever owned. At the same time, Congress is pushing the Fed to become more political.49 We are witnessing a historic transformation of the Fed’s role, which is likely to be permanent: a larger-than-ever central bank with more pervasive influence and control.
In response to this momentous change, traditional media channels have zeroed in on minute expenditures with politicized keywords, ignoring the larger story. Some other outlets, such as Reuters50 and Brookings,51 generated comprehensive reviews that were simply more readable summaries of the Federal Reserve’s own explanations.52 Both summaries left serious questions unanswered.
The bigger picture, the balance sheet itself,53 can be tough to interpret. The table below summarizes the main points, noting which major assets the Central Bank holds, in what proportions, and why they’re important:
The Fed’s Buys are (Becoming) Indicators
This expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet creates the largest and quickest swell of the money supply in U.S. history, with far-reaching implications for public and private credit and risk.
The massive purchase of $4.48 trillion in treasury bonds is meant to boost the bonds’ demand and lower their interest rates, allowing Congress to borrow money cheaply. This public borrowing enables deficit spending, perhaps to stimulate aggregate market demand61 in hopes of jumpstarting the economy and creating jobs. But, due to lockdown measures, only a very limited uptick in employment or consumption is possible. More likely, as happened in 2008, the purchase is simply a backstop against financial meltdown, propping up treasury bond values to deter a sell-off. It may also ensure that if the government is unable to pay its debts, the money is owed to its own central bank rather than to the public. It is, after all, much easier to apologize to oneself.
MZM MONEY STOCK
In any case, the bulk buy portends a treacherous business landscape, with one exception: the more publicly-funded sectors, such as transit and infrastructure, could receive cash infusions over the coming months as federal deficit spending attempts to drive against the headwinds of the struggling labor market (the Congressional Budget Office predicts a slow recovery of production and employment from their worst lows in nearly a century). Public works construction may therefore see new growth, cushioning some of the lost construction demand.
The second-largest purchase, the mortgage-backed securities totaling $2.04 trillion, represents 20% of all securitized mortgage debt in the U.S.62 All told, the Fed now carries about a fifth of the nation’s securitized debt — the majority in real estate loans — on its own balance sheet, making its share the highest it has ever been.63 To investors, this sends a stark warning: real estate values are in trouble, and so is the tremendous credit market that supports them. Be wary of business deals that rely too heavily on real estate investment trusts (REITs), mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), or real-estate-based business equity.
The Liquidity Facilities category, currently about $100 billion (but which soared past $542 billion in April64), is the most opaque of the lot. In truth, it’s a “miscellaneous” basket of credit instruments, including some dozen purchasing programs65 that allow the Central Bank to intervene in a wide array of primary credit institutions and secondary credit markets. It can also originate loans directly to businesses, buy swaps on foreign currency, purchase asset-backed securities, and use its purchasing power to shift “repo” (repurchase agreement66) interest rates at its discretion.
While in large part it answers to Congress, the Fed has no outside spending limit on these facilities — only the benchmarks set by its own internal board of directors, who can opt to change them at any time. Many programs in this category were set to expire by September 30th, but it was announced in late July67 that they would be extended at least through the end of the year, tacitly leaving the door open for a wide range of market interventions.
While this segment of the balance sheet is comparatively small, it represents something much deeper to the business world: an expansion of the Federal Reserve’s controls over market behavior and prices. For those who assiduously study market fundamentals — interest rates, employment, creditworthiness, international currency trends, real estate values, etc. — this change in monetary policy gives investors a new set of fundamentals to monitor. Leading indicators that worked in the past will no longer produce an accurate reading of market forces.
FEDERAL RESERVE LENDING
The Fed’s new powers have not gone unnoticed. In an article titled, “The Federal Reserve is Changing What it Means to be a Central Bank,” the Wall Street Journal reported the Fed “is breaking century-old taboos about who gets money from the Central Bank in a crisis, on what terms, and what risks it will take about getting that money back,”70 The Journal also expects the Fed balance sheet — and its active role in the market — to continue expanding to the end of the year: “Economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal this month [July] projected the Fed’s asset portfolio, or balance sheet, to end the year at $8.7 trillion, versus their May estimate of $9.3 trillion.”71
These estimates would mean a total increase in the range of 107% to 121% of last year’s balance, more than doubling it in a year’s time. Wells Fargo’s Securities Economics Group forecast an even wider range of possibilities, noting that “The biggest wild card in our balance sheet projection is the evolution of the new lending facilities that are just now getting up and running.”72 Basing their analysis on the Fed’s historical response to the 2008 global financial crisis and 2019 repo market freeze,73 they extrapolate two possible scenarios for 2020:
Under our base-case scenario, in which the economy continues to gradually recover and tensions do not spike again in financial markets, we see the balance sheet growing to roughly $7.6 trillion by the end of 2020. But, it could easily grow to $11 trillion by year end under a “worst-case” scenario. Under this scenario, the balance sheet would be equivalent to roughly 50% of U.S. nominal GDP, double the ratio that was reached in 2014 when the balance sheet was previously at a record high.74
This worst-case scenario would mean a 162% balance increase over last year. It would also mean that the Fed had created half as much money as the entire U.S. economy produced in as much time. No precedent exists to indicate what the free market would do in such a scenario.
What’s the bottom line? Fed policies, public health policies,75 and pandemic probability curves — not fundamentals — are now steering the market. For those who want to weather this storm, it will take a more fine-grained approach than simply watching the Fed, but a pilot still has to check the radar before takeoff. Many pilots, sensing adverse weather, will opt to remain on the ground.
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1International Monetary Fund. (2020, October 01). World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020
2World Bank Group. (2020, June). Global Economic Prospects. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
3Baker, S. (2020, July 13). Global economy on the rebound, but plenty of potholes still seen. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.pionline.com/special-report-midyear-outlook/global-economy-rebound-plenty-potholes-still-seen
4World Bank Group. (2020). GDP growth (annual %). Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
5Economic Times. (2020, June 09). Global economy to plunge into worst recession since WW-II: World Bank. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/global-economy-to-plunge-into-worst-recession-since-ww-ii-world-bank/articleshow/76267007.cms?from=mdr
6Lee, J. (2020, June 17). JPMorgan Sounds Warning on Market Correlations at 20-Year Highs. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-17/jpmorgan-sounds-warning-on-market-correlations-at-20-year-highs
7Carey, D., & Lauricella, T. (2020, March 06). Correlations Going to 1: Amid Market Collapse, U.S. Stock Fund Factors Show Little Differentiation. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.morningstar.com/articles/970137/correlations-going-to-1-amid-market-collapse-us-stock-fund-factors-show-little-differentiation
8Langlois, S. (2020, June 01). The economist who’s warning of a 40% drop in the stock market this year just took credit for predicting the riots. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-economist-whos-warning-of-a-40-drop-in-the-stock-market-this-year-just-took-credit-for-predicting-the-riots-2020-06-01
9Roubini, N. (2020, April 28). The coming Greater Depression of the 2020s. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-coming-greater-depression-of-the-2020s-2020-04-28?mod=article_inline
10Foimbert, F. (2020, June 17). Jeremy Grantham says this may be the 4th major market bubble of his career. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/jeremy-grantham-says-this-may-be-the-4th-major-market-bubble-of-his-career.html
11Nagarajan, S. (2020, June 18). Legendary investor Jeremy Grantham says the stock market right now is in the 4th ‘real McCoy’ bubble of his career | Markets Insider. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/stock-market-bubble-real-mccoy-investor-jeremy-grantham-2020-6-1029320808
12Langlois, S. (2020, August 13). George Soros bashes ‘trickster’ Trump and stays out of market bubble. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/george-soros-bashes-trickster-trump-and-stays-out-of-market-bubble-20200813
13Arora, N. (2020, August 18). Warren Buffett undergoes a conversion on gold - should you follow him? Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/warren-buffett-undergoes-a-conversion-on-gold-should-you-follow-him-2020-08-17
14Suttmeier, R. H. (2020, July 10). The Fed’s Balance Sheet Is Driving The Stock Market. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2020/07/10/the-feds-balance-sheet-is-driving-the-stock-market/
15Parlin, A. (2020, September 07). This US stock bubble could rank among the biggest in history. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.ft.com/content/9d12ae03-2f6b-4028-8464-e305269e7ee3
16International Monetary Fund. (2020, June 01). World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020: A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020
17World Bank Group. (2020, June). Global Economic Prospects. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
20World Bank Group. (2020). GDP growth (annual %). Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
21International Monetary Fund. (2020, October 01). World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020
22World Bank Group. (2020, June). Global Economic Prospects. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
23Johnstone, S., Saridakis, G., & Wilkinson, A. (2019, July 26). The Global Financial Crisis, Work and Employment: Ten Years On, 2019. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0143831X19866532
24International Labor Organization. (2020, June 30). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Fifth edition. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_749399.pdf
25International Labor Organization. (2020, September 23). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Sixth edition. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_755910.pdf
26World Bank Group. (2020). World Development Indicators. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators
27World Bank Group. (2020, June). Global Economic Prospects. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects p. 133
28Ibid, p. 15
29Ibid, p. 4
30International Monetary Fund. (2020, October 01). World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020 p. 55
31C, K. N., & O’Sullivan, M. (2019, June 28). Globalisation is dead and we need to invent a new world order. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/06/28/globalisation-is-dead-and-we-need-to-invent-a-new-world-order
32Rapoza, K. (2020, April 04). The Post-Coronavirus World May Be The End Of Globalization. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/03/the-post-coronavirus-world-may-be-the-end-of-globalization/
33Babones, S. (2020, April 25). Don’t Bash Globalization-It Will Rescue Our Economies After the Pandemic. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/25/globalization-economic-recovery-coronavirus-pandemic/
34Shiller, R. J., Stiglitz, J. E., Gopinath, G., Reinhart, C. M., Posen, A., Prasad, E., Tooze, A., Tyson, L., Mahbubani, K. (2020, April 15). How the Economy Will Look After the Coronavirus Pandemic. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/15/how-the-economy-will-look-after-the-coronavirus-pandemic/
35Kochhar, R. (2020, August 26). Unemployment rose higher in three months of COVID-19 than it did in two years of the Great Recession. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/
36Macrotrends. (2020, September). U6 Unemployment Rate. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.macrotrends.net/1377/u6-unemployment-rate
37Kochhar, R. (2020, August 26). Unemployment rose higher in three months of COVID-19 than it did in two years of the Great Recession. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/
38Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. (2020, July 30). Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate) and Annual Update. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv.pdf
39Isaac, M. (2020, July 31). Big Tech Earnings Surge as Economy Slumps. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/07/30/business/stock-market-today-coronavirus
40Zong, J., Williams, R., & Sheth, A. (2020, July 23). Post-COVID shifts in consumption will affect credit fundamentals across sectors. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1231994
41Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. (2020, October 29). News Release. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-third-quarter-2020-advance-estimate
42Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. (2020, October 28). Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm
43Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. (2020, September 16). Chair’s FOMC Press Conference Projections Materials. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20200916.pdf
44Yellen, J. (2016, August 26). Speech by Chair Yellen on the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy toolkit: Past, present, and future. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.htm
45Greenwood, R., Hanson, S. G., & Stein, J. C. (2016). The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2016/2016steingreenwoodhanson.pdf?la=en
46Jones, C. (2020, June 19). Inflation is higher than the official numbers. Retrieved October 30, 2020, from https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/06/19/1592573810000/Inflation-is-higher-than-the-official-numbers/
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68TALF = Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
MSF = Main Street Lending Program
MLF = Municipal Liquidity Facility
CCF = Corporate Credit Facilities
CPFF = Commercial Paper Funding Facility
PPPLF = Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility
FIMA Repos = Foreign and International Monetary Authorities Repurchase Programs
DW = Discount Window Lending
PDCF = Primary Dealer Credit Facility
MMLF = Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
AMLF = Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
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